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arbitrageur is only interested in a short term investment. If delay increases
through hearings in state administrative agencies, the uncertainty of the
outcome discourages participation of the arbitrageur. This uncertainty will
ultimately cause the market price to drop and may deprive the shareholder
of an attractive market. Thus, delay alone does not inherently harm the
shareholders, and at times may benefit the shareholders. 59
The court did not discuss the ability of an efficient target company to take
these same or other active defenses during the post-effective delay required
by federal law.' A crucial distinction should be drawn between post-effec-
tive delay in the federal law and pre-effective delay under the Idaho statute.
Congress allowed the shareholder ten days after the offer was effective to
consider the options and to decide whether to tender his shares. Traditional-
ly shareholders have taken advantage of this waiting period and tendered
their shares at the last minute the offer is open or immediately before the
end of the period of pro rata take-up of tenders. 61 The state law, however,
places the tools of control in the hands of the target company's management
which may delay and defeat the offer before it becomes effective. The state
law would, therefore, deprive the shareholders of any participation in the
decision and deprive them of an enhanced market and the opportunity to
participate in that market. In practical effect, the state law thus placed an
onerous burden on interstate commerce.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of Judge Hill in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell is
truly landmark, as it casts serious doubt on the 'Validity of all state take-over
statutes. Because the numerous state statutes are remarkably similar, the
impact of this decision is far reaching. Due to the lack of previous judicial
review of these take-over laws, Great Western becomes the sole precedent
upon which to rely.
Mary Emma Ackels
Redefinition of "Liability" for Section
357(c) Purposes: Focht v. Commissioner
Donald Focht owned and operated a plumbing and heating service,
conducting the business as a sole proprietorship on the cash receipts and
59. There is also the paradox that management's ability to fight and delay the offer may
produce a better offer, thereby benefiting the shareholders.
60. Companies who are susceptible to a take-over usually have "blue books" which are
check lists of defenses ready to be used at a moment's notice. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 7, at 224.
61. Bromberg, supra note 58, at 616; see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419
F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 1969) (85% of the tenders made on the very last day of the contested
exchange offer).
NOTES
disbursements method of accounting.' Focht incorporated his business dur-
ing the taxable year of 1970, transferring all of the assets and liabilities of the
sole proprietorship to the newly formed corporation in exchange for all of
the stock of the corporation. 2 The bulk of the liabilities transferred consisted
of accounts payable and the bulk of the assets transferred consisted of
accounts receivable. Internal Revenue Code section 357(c) requires that gain
be recognized by the transferor in such a transaction to the extent that the
liabilities assumed by the new corporation exceed the adjusted basis of the
assets transferred.' Because the sole proprietorship was operated on the
cash method, the accounts receivable transferred had an adjusted basis of
zero. The Commissioner, however, in computing the amount of liabilities
assumed, valued the accounts payable in full. The result was that the newly
formed corporation assumed greater liabilities than assets. The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency in the taxpayer's 1970 return, and Donald Focht
filed suit in the Tax Court to dispute the deficiency. In deciding for the
taxpayer, the Tax Court held that an obligation, payment of which would
have been deductible if made by the transferor, shall not be treated as a
"liability" for purposes of sections 357 and 358. Focht v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 223 (1977).
I. EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 357(c)
When a going business incorporates, the owners usually transfer all of the
assets and liabilities of the business to the newly formed corporation in
exchange for the stock of the corporation.4 As Congress requires any gain or
loss from a sale or other disposition of property to be recognized, such a
transfer would appear to be a taxable event. 5 In the context of the incorpora-
tion of a going business, however, Congress has provided a specific excep-
tion to the recognition requirement. 6 When stock is received pursuant to the
nonrecognition principle of section 351(a), its basis is adjusted by section
358 to the basis of the property for which it was transferred. 7 Incorporations
have thus been made easier through the nonrecognition provisions, while the
basis adjustment provision allows the government to tax any realized gain
upon subsequent sale of the stock. The exemption of section 351(a), how-
ever, only applies when the transferor receives stock or securities in ex-
1. I.R.C. § 446(c)(1).
2. This exchange was carried out pursuant to id. § 351(a) which provides that no gain or
loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely
in exchange for stock or securities, if after the exchange the transferors are in control of the
corporation.
3. Id. § 357(c) states that, "if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed . . .
exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property transferred pursuant to such exchange,
then such excess shall be considered as a gain .... "
4. See Comment, Section 357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1154
(1967).
5. I.R.C. § 1001(c).
6. Id. § 351(a).
7. Id. § 358(a) states that, the basis of the property received under § 35 1(a) is the same as
that of the property exchanged, decreased by the amount of any "money" received by the
taxpayer and increased by the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was recognized on such
exchange.
Id. § 358(d) further provides that for purposes of § 358(a) assumption of a liability by a
transferee shall be treated as money received by the transferor on the exchange.
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change for the transferred property. Section 351(b) provides that if the
transferor receives "money or other property," in addition to stock or
securities, gain to that extent must be recognized. 8
The statutory design created by the interplay of these sections of the
Internal Revenue Code reflects the original design of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, 9 the congressional intent being to alleviate the burden of
incurring taxation on a mere change in the form of a business.'° The Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Hendler,"1 however, presented a
major obstacle to the smooth operation of this statutory scheme. In Hendler
there had been a transfer by Hendler of assets subject to liabilities in
exchange for stock. The Court treated the assumption of Hendler's
liabilities as "money or other property," thus bringing the transaction within
the purview of the predecessor to section 351(b). 12
As a practical matter, most business assets are generally subject to some
liabilities. To treat the assumption of such liabilities as "boot" requiring
immediate recognition by the transferor would certainly make incorporation
a less desirable alternative. Thus, realizing the implications of such a hold-
ing, Congress enacted the predecessor of sections 357(a) and (b),13 which in
effect stated that an assumption of liabilities by a transferee was not to be
treated as "money or other property" as long as its assumption had a bona
fide business purpose and was not motivated simply to avoid the payment of
taxes.' 4 In treating the assumption of liabilities in this manner, however,
another problem arose: a taxpayer could mortgage property he owned for an
amount in excess of his adjusted basis in the property prior to the tax free
transfer, and have the corporation assume the obligation. 5 Presuming this
8. Id. § 35 1(b) provides that if subsection (a) would apply to an exchange but for the fact
that money or other property was received, then, "gain (if any) to such recipient shall be
recognized, but not in excess of. . . the amount of money received, plus . . . the fair market
value of such other property received.".
9. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b)(5), 53 Stat. 37 (now I.R.C. § 351(a)); Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I, § 12(c)(I), 53 Stat. 39 (now I.R.C. § 351(b)); Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 113(a)(6), 53 Stat. 41 (now I.R.C. § 358(a)).
10. Comment, supra note 4, at 1154.
I. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(c)(1), 53 Stat. 39 (now I.R.C. § 351 (b)).
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(k), as amended by Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 213(a),
53 Stat. 870 (now I.R.C. §§ 357(a), (b)).
14. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939) states:
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Hendler . . . has been
broadly interpreted to require that, if a taxpayer's liabilities are assumed by
another party in what is otherwise a tax-free reorganization, gain is recognized to
the extent of the assumption. In typical transactions changing the form or entity
of a business it is not customary to liquidate the liabilities of the business and such
liabilities are almost invariably assumed by the corporation which continues the
business. Your committee therefore believes that such a broad interpretation as is
indicated above will largely nullify the provisions of existing law which postpone
the recognition of gain in such cases. To enable bona fide transactions of this type
to be carried on without the recognition of gain, the committee has recommended
[the following:]
. . . [A]dding a new subsection (k) which provides that . . . . gain shall not be
recognized to the transferor on account of the assumption of liabilities or the
transfer of property subject to liability. It is expressly provided that this provision
shall not apply where it appears that the principal purpose of the [transferor]...
was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or . . . was not a
bona fide business purpose.
15. The practice of mortgaging property for an amount in excess of the basis and then
transferring the mortgaged property to the corporation is called "borrowing out".the property.
[Vol. 32
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was conducted for a legitimate business purpose, there would be no gain
recognition on the transaction. Thus, the Service's only alternative was to
adjust the basis of the stock received by the transferor to reflect this
assumption of liability. 16 As a result, if liabilities exceeded the basis of the
property, the taxpayer acquired a negative basis in his stock.' 7 To avoid the
problematic "negative basis" situation, and the corresponding possibility of
a large loss of revenue," Congress enacted section 357(c). 19 To the extent
that the liabilities assumed exceeded the adjusted basis in the assets trans-
ferred, section 357(c) provided for this excess to be treated as gain. In such a
case, the basis of the stock acquired would be reduced to zero and the
excess, which would have reduced the basis below zero, would be taxed as
gain.20
Considered together, sections 351, 357, and 358 suggest a congressional
design to defer recognition of gain on incorporations involving transfers of
assets and liabilities for stock, but to avoid creation of a negative basis in the
stock so acquired. This relatively coherent design may be strained,
however, where pursuant to a section 351 transfer a taxpayer transfers
accounts receivable and payable to the corporation. The problem is one of
valuation of the receivables and payables, which depends in large part on the
accounting method used by the taxpayer. 21 If the transferor is on the accrual
See Comment, Bongiovanni v. Commissioner: Tax-Free Transfer of Payables by Cash Method
Taxpayer Upon Incorporation, 35 U. PITr. L. REV. 158, 159 (1973).
16. Such an adjustment is provided for in I.R.C. §§ 358(a), (d).
17. See Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653,658 (9th Cir. 1961). This case arose prior to
the enactment of § 357(c). The court stated that the taxpayer could not be required to recognize
gain against the express words of the statute and, therefore, held the stock acquired by the
transferor in the transaction to have a negative basis. See also Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). For a case discussing the possibility of a negative
basis in property, see Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951).
18. The loss of revenue was largely due to I.R.C. § 1014(a), which provides that the basis of
property acquired by devise was "stepped-up" to its fair market value at the date of the
decendent's death. Thus a transferor could hold this stock until his death, whereupon the basis
in the hands of the person acquiring from the deceased was stepped-up, leaving the gain thus
realized unrecognizable; this step-up in basis obviously created a large revenue loss for the
government. Burke & Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free Incorporations, 25
TAX L. REV. 211, 213 (1970); Comment, Bongiovanni v. Commissioner: False Hopes for Cash
Basis Taxpayers, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 864 (1973). This problem, however, is largely
obviated by I.R.C. § 1023.
19. I.R.C. § 357(c). Commentators generally agree that § 357(c) was designed in large part
to avoid the negative basis problem. See Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir.
1961). See also Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1359-60 (1962); Wellen, New
Solutions to the Section 357(c) Problem, 52 TAXES 361, 363-64 (1974). But see Del Cotto, Section
357(c): Some Observations on Tax Effects to the Cash Basis Transferor, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 1,
6 (1974) (which suggests that an elimination of a negative basis is merely a by-product of a more
fundamental purpose of § 357(c)).
The Tax Court in Focht suggested that § 357(c) was enacted simply to provide an objective
replacement to the subjective test of § 357(b). 68 T.C. at 235. The court, however, cited no
support for this theory. In addition, the treatment under the two approaches would be very
different. Under § 357(b), the entire amount of the liabilities assumed is treated as "money
received," subject to treatment as gain, while § 357(c) merely requires the excess of liabilities
over the adjusted basis in the assets to be treated as gain. See [1975] 233-2d TAX MNGM'T (BNA)
A-13 & A-23.
20. See, Treas.Reg. § 1.357-2(a), T.D. 6528, 1961-1 C.B. 81-82.
21. I.R.C. § 446(c). The methods relevant to this discussion are the accrual method and the
cash method. Accrual method accounting takes the asset or liability into income when the right
to receive it becomes fixed or the obligation to pay it is incurred. Cash method accounting, on
the other hand, receives the asset or liability into income when the money is actually or
constructively received or the debt is actually paid.
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method, there is no problem as receivables and payables have been taken
into income and are valued at their face value. 22 In this context, the scheme
of sections 351, 357, and 358 is not disrupted.23 If, however, the transferor is
on the cash method, receivables have an adjusted basis of zero, and the
payables are valued by the Service at their full face value. 24
The case of Peter Raich25 brought the dilemma of the cash method trans-
feror into clear focus. In that case, Raich, a cash method taxpayer, incor-
porated a going business, exchanging receivables and payables for the stock
of the newly formed corporation. Because Raich was on the cash method,
his receivables had an adjusted basis of zero,26 while the Commissioner
determined that the amount of liabilities transferred included the full value
of the payables. 27 Pursuant to section 357(c), Raich was required to recog-
nize as gain the excess of the liabilities assumed over the adjusted basis of
the assets received. This gain recognition was required notwithstanding the
fact that the market value of the receivables transferred exceeded the value
of the payables. The Tax Court admitted that the Commissioner's approach
worked a hardship on the taxpayer and might not be consistent with the
congressional intent to facilitate incorporations of going businesses, 28 but
nonetheless upheld the Commissioner's literal reading of section 357(c)
While this approach was criticized,29 the Tax Court continued to apply this
analysis when confronted with cases involving similar facts.
22. If, however, the liabilities are greater than the basis in the assets, gain to that extent
must be recognized by the accrual method taxpayer. See Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
463 (1971).
23. "Section 357(c) of the Code operates in a fair and consistent manner in the instance of
the accrual basis taxpayer and seems to have been written with him in mind." Comment, supra
note 18, at 861.
24. See B. BIT1KER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 3.07, at 3-27 (3d ed. 1971). By the cash method, receivables have an adjusted
basis of zero because by definition items of this nature are not properly considered income until
collected despite the fact that they maintain their market value.
In a strict tax sense, for the cash method taxpayer, payables also should be given a zero value
because the payables are not deductible until paid. Presumably the payables were valued in full,
however, because in a practical sense, they do constitute an obligation and, therefore, would be
considered liabilities. Comment, supra note 15, at 164. Valuation of payables at face value,
nevertheless, is conceptually sound for accrual basis taxpayers. See, e.g., Rosen v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
25. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
26. Id. at 607.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 611.
29. The decision in Raich has been criticized for many reasons. One reason was that it
would be incongruous to value receivables at zero and to value payables at fair market value.
Either both should be valued at face or both at zero, "but to combine the two makes neither tax
nor accounting good sense." Comment, supra note 4, at 116. However artificial it may sound to
say that in this case the payables are not liabilities, for tax purposes they actually are not
liabilities until paid and deducted. The situation is the same with receivables, as they do not
appear on the tax balance sheet until the money is actually received and reported as income.
Comment, supra note 18, at 866.
Treating payables as liabilities within § 357(c) creates a situation where one single transaction
is split into two taxable gains, resulting in a partial loss of deferral. The use of payables as
liabilities within § 357(c) warrants the same use under § 358, which determines the basis of the
stock acquired. If receivables have a zero basis and payables are § 358(d) liabilities, a cash
method taxpayer with a balance sheet similar to that of the taxpayer in Raich will (I) recognize
gain on the § 351 exchange, and (2) have a zero basis in the stock and securities received so that
upon subsequent sale of the stock, he would realize and recognize the entire sales price as
taxable gain. The unfairness of this result is that the knowledgeable incorporator can avoid it
either by retaining both receivables and payables or by having the corporation purchase the
[Vol. 32
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As in Raich, the transferor in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner0 was on the
cash method. The Tax Court valued the payables at full face amount and the
receivables at zero. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed,
stating that the definition of section 357(c) "liabilities" was intended to
include "tax" liabilities, not "accounting" liabilities. The payables were
treated as "accounting" liabilities and, thus, were also valued at zero. 31
While achieving what most commentators agreed to be an equitable result,
the Bongiovanni approach was also questioned.32
In spite of this reversal, the Tax Court remained steadfast in its analysis
when subsequently faced with another incorporation involving treatment of
a cash method taxpayer's transfer of receivables and payables. In Thatcher
v. Commissioner"3 the Tax Court again valued the payables at face amount
and the receivables at zero. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court
was again reversed. The Ninth Circuit rejected the approach offered by the
Second Circuit,34 however, and devised yet another approach. Relying on
Judge Hall's dissent in the Tax Court opinion, 5 the Ninth Circuit held that to
the extent the assumed payables were actually paid by the transferee, the
receivables should be given a corresponding value in order to work a set-
off. 36 This set-off of payables actually paid against receivables otherwise
receivables, using the amount received in the purchase to pay off the payables. See Kahn &
Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73
MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (1975).
The alternatives illustrate that it would be more profitable for a potential incorporator to
liquidate and settle accounts before incorporation. This circumvention of the generally harsh
treatment resulting from the Raich approach might be inhibited, however, for fear of the
transaction's then coming within the "tax avoidance" clause of § 357(b). Thus, as recognized
by the Tax Court in Raich, Congress' objective of facilitating incorporations is not furthered.
46 T.C. at 607. In defense of the analysis used in Raich, however, it has been suggested that
strict interpretation of the statute is the only way to avoid substantially twisting the statutory
language. White, Sleepers That Travel With Section 351 Transfers, 56 VA. L. REV. 37, 42 (1970).
30. 40 T.C.M. (P-H) 1182 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972). For further discussion
of this case, see Note, Payables of a Cash Basis Taxpayer Under § 357(c), 10 Hous. L. REV.
1170 (1973); Note, Section 357(c): The Quest for Equality Between Accrual and Cash Basis
Taxpayers, 52 NEB. L. REV. 527 (1973).
31. 470 F.2d at 924. The court specifically held that:
Section 357(c) was meant to apply to what might be called 'tax' liabilities, i.e.,
liens in excess of tax costs, particularly mortgages encumbering property trans-
ferred in a Section 351 transaction . . . [whereas] [tihe payables of a cash basis
taxpayer are 'liabilities' for accounting purposes but should not be considered
'liabilities' for tax purposes under Section 357(c) until they are paid.
Id. (emphasis in original).
32. The Bongiovanni decision was criticized because it redefined the term "liability" in
order to correct an inequity. In so doing it created a new concept, "tax liabilities." Exactly
what constitutes a tax liability within § 357(c) will have to be defined on a case-by-case basis, as
the court did not set the limits for this definition. Until this is settled the seemingly simple
mechanical rule of § 357(c) will be uncertain and difficult to apply. Wellen, New Solutions to the
Section 357(c) Problem, 52 TAXES 361, 373 (1974). Another question raised by this redefinition
is its application to § 358(d) for purposes of determining the basis of the stock acquired. For
discussion of this point, see Barnett, Problems in Incorporating the Going Business, 59
A.B.A.J. 1190, 1191 (1973).
[1975] 233-2d TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-26 raised a similar question of the application of the
Bongiovanni definition of "liabilities" to § 357(a). If the use of the terms is the same, it could
mean a revitalization of Hendler.
33. 61 T.C. 28 (1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976).
34. The Ninth Circuit rejected the approach offered because, "the court [in Bongiovanni]
defined liabilities in an ad hoc manner that may have worked equity in that case, but the
definition is likely to produce unforeseen results in other cases." 533 F.2d at 1117.
35. 61 T.C. at 42.
36. 533 F.2d at 1117-18.
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valued at zero achieved an equitable result, but was also questioned. 37
Thus, prior to the Focht case, three alternatives for dealing with a transfer
of receivables and payables by an incorporating cash method transferor had
emerged. In Raich the Tax Court, applying the explicit language of section
357(c), gave receivables an adjusted basis of zero and valued payables at
market, despite its recognition of the inequity of the results.38 On appeal, the
courts in Bongiovanni and Thatcher, however, rejected the Raich approach
because of its inequity. The approach used in Bongiovanni was to give
receivables an adjusted basis of zero and value payables at zero. The final
alternative was that suggested in Thatcher, to value payables in full and to
give receivables an adjusted basis to the extent of the payables. With this
background, the Tax Court was presented with the case of Focht v.
Commissioner.
II. FOCHT V. COMMISSIONER
In Focht the petitioner, pursuant to an incorporation, had transferred all
of his assets and liabilities to the controlled corporation in exchange for the
stock of the corporation. Accounts receivable constituted the bulk of the
assets transferred, while accounts payable constituted the bulk of the
liabilities. The issue before the court was how receivables and payables
should be treated on their transfer to the corporation by the cash method
transferor. The court chose not to follow its holding, in Raich,39 but also
declared that it would not alter the Raich result by revaluing the receivables
as was done in Thatcher. The court stated flatly that receivables have an
37. The Ninth Circuit itself recognized one weakness in the solution it offered when it
stated that an approach treating receivables and payables as an ordinary sale and thereby setting
each other off "encroaches upon the strict construction of cash basis accounting." Id. at 1115.
The Ninth Circuit's valuation of receivables to the extent they equalled payables and taxing
the excess was criticized as making the transfer an ordinary taxable transfer, not a § 351
nonrecognition transfer.
The language of Section 357(c) does not suggest that it is a means of removing
transactions or parts of transactions from Section 351 . . . . If the transaction
meets the prerequisites set out in Section 351(a), it is a Section 351 transaction, by
definition. The fact that Section 357(c) gain . . . is recognized does not make the
transaction even in part an ordinary exchange.
Wellen, New Solutions to the Section 357(c) Problem, 52 TAXES 361, 375 (1974).
This approach may be conceptually unsound for yet another reason. In stating its reasoning
for allowing this set-off, the Ninth Circuit said that its holding "prevents treatment as gain of
something that was not in fact gain, but only appeared to enhance the partner's balance sheet
position because of the cash basis accounting method." 533 F.2d at 1118. The court reasoned
that the assumption of the accounts payable was not gain because their payment would have
been deductible to the transferor. Id. at 1118 n.9. As the Tax Court in Focht pointed out,
however, if the gain from the assumption of payables of a cash method taxpayer was not really
a gain, as suggested in Thatcher, then the problem would only be successfully handled where
the receivables were equal to or greater than payables. If payables were greater than receiv-
ables, there would merely be a partial offset and that which was admittedly not gain would be
treated as if it were.
38. Testor v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964), has been considered to be
authority in support of the Raich approach. See Comment, supra note 18, at 865; Comment,
supra note 15, at 166. In Testor the Seventh Circuit held that open account liabilities came
within the § 357(c) meaning of "liabilities." The facts in that case, however, may be distin-
guished from the facts in Raich in that the taxpayer's liabilities exceeded not only the adjusted
basis of the assets, but also their fair market value.
39. 68 T.C. at 229.
[Vol. 32
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adjusted basis of zero and, "this reasoning is now generally accepted. "I
Rather, the court chose to alter the Raich result by redefining "liability" for
purposes of sections 351 and 358, and thus held that obligations such as
payables, to the exent that their payment would be deductible if made by the
transferor, should no longer be treated as "liabilities" under sections 357
and 358. 4"
In order to support this interpretation and its application to sections 357
and 358, the court analyzed legislative and judicial history, beginning with
United States v. Hendler.42 In response to the Hendler decision Congress
had enacted legislation which recognized that the assumption of liability was
in fact gain, but exempted such gain from the recognition requirement. 43 The
Tax Court in Focht thus derived from this the idea that Congress meant to
exempt through section 357(a) only those liabilities which, if assumed by a
transferee in a tax free exchange, would cause gain recognition.4
The court next discussed which liabilities would cause gain when as-
sumed. Crane v. Commissioner 5 was cited for the proposition that liabilities
which are otherwise deductible items do not cause a recognition of gain
when assumed, and, therefore, do not come within the meaning of "liabili-
ty" in section 357(a).1 The Tax Court concluded that for purposes of section
357(a) the word "liability" would not encompass accounts payable.
The court then applied this redefinition of "liability" for section 357(a)
purposes to section 357(c). This was rationalized by stating that Congress
had enacted section 357(c) to apply in an automatic and mechanical fashion47
to situations formerly controlled by section 357(b). Congress had enacted
section 357(c), the court stated, because section 357(b) was too subjective in
that it required a determination of a taxpayer's motives. If section 357(c)
acted only as an exception to 357(a), the court reasoned, the term "liability"
in both sections must have the same meaning. 48 As such, it concluded that
"liability" should be limited under both sections to apply only to those
obligations which cause gain when assumed. An obligation, to the extent
that its payment would have been deductible if made by the transferor,
should therefore not be included within such a definition of "liability."149
40. Id. See, e.g., Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940).
41. 68 T.C. at 229.
42. 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). For discussion of Hendler, see text accompanying note I1
supra.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 14.
44. 68 T.C. at 233.
45. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
46. The Crane case involved a transfer of real property subject to a mortgage on which
interest was due. The Supreme Court concluded that the mortgage assumed by the transferee
was part of the amount realized by the transferor, but the assumption of the interest payment
due on the mortgage was not part of the amount received. The Court stated: "The Commission-
er explains that only the principal amount, rather than the total present debt secured by the
mortgage, was deemed to be a measure of the amount realized, because the difference was
attributable to interest due, a deductible item." Id. at 4 n.6. Thus, because the interest payment
would have been deductible if made by the transferor, it was not included as part of the amount
received.
47. 68 T.C. at 235.
48. While the court characterized § 357(c) as being the product of congressional discontent
with § 357(b), an alternative explanation has been noted. See note 19 supra.
49. The court stated that, "where section 357(a) does not apply, section 357(c) should not
apply." 68 T.C. at 235. It further held that payables, to the extent deductible, should not come
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The court arrived at what it determined to be an equitable result, yet gave
full recognition to congressional intent "by preventing the recognition of
gain or loss where there has been a mere change in the form of own-
ership. -10
Judge Hall, the dissenting judge in the Tax Court in Thatcher,5t criticized
the decision in dissent as "inconsistent with the plain wording of the stat-
ute," 52 and as lacking the support of the "legislative history" upon which
the majority relied so heavily.53 Judge Hall observed that in relying on the
footnote in Crane the court constructed "a purely hypothetical legislative
history out of a random footnote in a Supreme Court decision." 54 Judge Hall
also postulated that the court's approach would lead to substantial questions
in interpreting the word "liability" when it appeared in other sections of the
Code. 5 Concern was further expressed that the majority position provided a
deduction when the payables were assumed regardless of whether or not
they were actually paid. If the payables were subsequently not paid, the
profit went untaxed.
The most convincing opinion in Focht was presented by Judge Tannen-
wald in dissent. It was his conclusion that with the decision in Focht, there
were then three different theories of the application of section 357(c) to
section 351 incorporations of a cash method taxpayer transferring receiv-
ables and payables. 56 This, Tannenwald surmised, was the most compelling
ground for according the word "liability" its ordinary meaning in the
context of section 357(c). The court's efforts were seen as an attempt to
legislate remedial matters regarding section 357(c), an effort appropriate for
the legislative branch, not the judiciary.
The obvious "separation of powers" considerations aside, serious prob-
within the meaning of § 351(a). This particular holding might raise the problem of treating
payables under the § 351(b) treatment of "money or other property." If so, the problem created
by Hendler may re-emerge.
50. Id. The court stated that this approach, unlike the Ninth Circuit's Thatcher approach,
'alleviates the problems raised when a cash method taxpayer transfers insufficient receivables
to cover the proposed gain under section 357(c)." Id. at 237. Thus, the offset or wash approach
would be of little help to the taxpayer whose payables were greater than the receivables. For
criticism of Thatcher along these lines, see note 37 supra.
In a concurring opinion Judge Wilber made the point that in all likelihood Congress never
focused on the matter presently before the court. Thus, he concluded, the court's function in
this case was to determine what the legislature would have intended on this point had it been
presented. 68 T.C. at 240.
51. Judge Hall's dissenting opinion in Thatcher was adopted by the Ninth Circuit on
appeal. See note 37 supra.
52. 68 T.C. at 243.
53. In reference to the footnote cited in Crane, upon which the court so heavily relied,
Judge Hall stated:
This footnote . . . provides insufficient reason for us to conclude that Congress
in enacting section 357 had anything in mind beyond the normal meaning of the
word 'liability.' It may or may not be that had Congress thought about it, it would
have so limited section 357 A la Crane. But since we do not sit as a legislature, it is
not for us to rewrite the statute.
Id. at 244.
54. Id.
55. Judge Hall observed that by computer search it had been determined that the word
"liability" appears in the Code some 400 times. Id.
56. Id. at 242-43. With the Seventh Circuit's holding in Testor there are probably four
varying approaches, as the Seventh Circuit could be cited as approval for the Raich approach.
For the different approaches, see notes 30, 34, 38 supra and accompanying text.
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NOTES
lems may arise when courts attempt to reach an equitable result in cases
where a literal application of legislation might not follow congressional
intent. The decision in Focht may be cited as an illustration of this fact.
After Hendler, an assumption of a liability by a transferee in an incorpora-
tion was considered to be "boot," requiring gain recognition to that extent
by section 351(b). Section 357(a) and (b) were enacted in response to elimi-
nate the necessity for gain recognition when a liability was assumed. The
court's redefinition of liability for section 357(c) purposes, however, raises
the question of whether an assumption of an account payable by a transferee
would constitute "boot" under section 351(b), thereby requiring gain recog-
nition. 57 As a practical matter the Tax Court has illustrated that it will not be
bound by rigid applications of section 357(c). As such, there should be little
concern that an attempted revitalization of Hendler by the Service would be
effective if the question were litigated. As a theoretical matter, however, it
is more than mere cavil to urge that legislation have a clear meaning and a
consistent application. When taxpayers must resort to the courts to circum-
vent inequities arising from the literal application of legislation, it is an
indication that it is time for the legislation in question to be reevaluated.
Section 357(c) should be reexamined by Congress with the problems of a
transfer of receivables and payables by a cash method transferor in mind, so
that changes in the mere form of a business produce the same tax conse-
quences regardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting.
III. CONCLUSION
The cases prior to Focht illustrated the pervasive uncertainty of the
application of section 357(c) in a section 351 incorporation involving a cash
method transferor transferring receivables and payables. The Tax Court had
remained steadfast in its literal application of section 357(c). In the face of
strong opposition from the Second and Ninth Circuits, however, the Tax
Court was forced to reevaluate its position. This retreat from adherence to
the literal interpretation of section 357(c) has resulted in a redefinition of the
word "liability" for purposes of sections 357 and 358. This redefinition
achieves an equitable result, but raises problems of a consistent interpreta-
tion and application of section 357(c) by the various jurisdictions in the
future.
Ben C. Broocks
57. See [1975] 233-2d TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-26 for discussion of a similar problem as
regards the Bongiovanni definition of "liability."
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